I missed this last Sunday when Wes reviewed To Dare and to Conquer: Special Operations and the Destiny of Nations, from Achilles to Al Qaeda by Derek Leebaert in WaPo. Here's a clip:

Leebaert scores some solid hits here. What actually was achieved by U.S. special ops in Eastern Europe, Korea and Vietnam? Very little, he argues. For years during the Cold War, the United States dispatched teams (including not just fighters but also ammunition and communication tools) behind the Iron Curtain to assist East European freedom fighters; without exception, the teams seem to have been compromised, whereupon they were captured and eliminated. Washington got no better results against North Vietnam, either.

What happens when government agencies fight over the policy direction and control of commando forces? Inevitable failure, according to Leebaert. He also encourages readers not to see more commandos as a panacea, which is an obvious temptation; after all, since Leebaert convincingly argues that daring, adaptable special forces are essential to modern warfare and defense, why not pump in resources and build them up quickly? Because it takes special people, patient years of preparation and a particular culture. And even then, Leebaert notes, the effort to build a sizable force of special operators is likely to weed out the very qualities -- like recklessness and a certain disdain for conventional thinking -- that most successful special operations have in common.

A few warnings to the reader are probably in order. To Dare and to Conquer has a truly broad scope, and it often involves a lot more "telling" than "showing." It's largely Western-oriented, so there's no Sun Tzu, Genghis Khan or Tamerlane here. There's also little on the Soviet Union's spetsnaz ("special purpose") forces, beyond Leebaert's assertion that they were among the best in the world. The reader is left wondering whether the Soviets were really any good -- especially since the seven spetsnaz units of around 250 men each deployed to Afghanistan in the 1980s to fight the anti-Soviet mujaheddin "found themselves bayoneting smoke."

That raises a painful question: Even now, with the most modern technology, are U.S. special forces any better? Has the dismal record of U.S. efforts in Korea and Vietnam really been replaced by brilliant commando successes in the war on terrorism? In fact, despite Leebaert's obvious -- indeed, almost fawning -- admiration for the cunning, skill and daring of special operators throughout history, his is a cautionary tale for the United States: Don't look for cheap, easy solutions; don't think that cowboy tactics like torturing opponents will work; don't assume that you can build up the right capabilities overnight; and above all, don't believe that a few daring men (or women) at the cutting edge can resolve the contradictions and dilemmas associated with faulty policies and poor decision-making at the top.

To Dare and to Conquer by Derek Leebaert at Amazon.